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  A primary change to crop insurance contained in the USDA’s Farm Bill proposal is sup-
plemental deductible coverage (SDC). SDC would allow farmers who purchase individual 
crop insurance coverage to purchase area-wide coverage in the amount of the individual policy 
deductible. This supplemental area-wide coverage would be similar to the existing Group Risk 
Plan policy, but with an accelerated indemnity schedule. Analysis indicates that SDC in-
creases farmer certainty equivalents. The largest benefits are realized by farmers with high 
yield potential in counties with greater systemic risk. In general, optimal individual policy 
coverage levels modestly decrease when SDC is taken. 
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The Administration released the USDA 2007 
Farm Bill proposal in early 2007 (USDA 2007a). 
Among its recommendations were several pro-
posed modifications of current crop insurance 
programs under Title X (USDA 2007b). The first 
of these recommended offering supplemental 
deductible coverage (SDC). This proposed SDC 
would “Allow farmers to purchase supplemental 
insurance that would cover all or part of their 
individual policy deductible in the event of a 
county or area wide loss” (USDA 2007b, p. 151). 
Additional discussion indicates that the intent of 
this provision was to improve the safety net for 
crop producers by offering full coverage (100 
percent of the value of expected yield). 
  The current federal crop insurance program 
offers two types of yield insurance for farmers—
individual coverage and area-wide coverage. The 
individual coverage pays indemnities when a 
farmer’s harvested yield falls below a chosen 
percentage of the farmer’s individual average 
yield. This individual average yield is calculated 
based on a farmer’s actual production history 
(APH); hence the name of the policy is APH.
1 
Area-wide coverage as provided by the current 
program pays indemnities when the actual county 
average yield officially reported by the USDA 
falls below a chosen percentage of the expected 
county yield. This policy is called the Group Risk 
Plan (GRP). As proposed in the USDA 2007 
Farm Bill proposal, SDC would allow farmers to 
combine a modified form of area-wide GRP cov-
erage with individual APH coverage. This layered 
                                                                                    
1 Although the intent of the APH program is to provide coverage 
based on the historical average yield for an insured unit, practical 
considerations in implementation have given rise to a number of ex-
ceptions. For example, alternative procedures are used in determining 
the insured yield for (i) new producers, (ii) producers adding land not 
previously planted to the crop, (iii) producers with average yield less 
than a given percentage of a county yield (t-yield) specified in the 
policy, with the percentage depending on the number of years of yields 
in the yield series, (iv) producers who would experience a large change 
in their insured yield from one insurance year to the next, and (v) 
producers experiencing a yield less than 60 percent of the county t-
yield in one or more years. 
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coverage would offer producers a higher level of 
yield risk protection while avoiding excessive 
government exposure to adverse selection and 
moral hazard that could result if such high levels 
of individual coverage were offered. 
  The SDC concept raises interesting policy 
questions, a few of which we examine here. Spe-
cifically, for a variety of empirically based as-
sumptions regarding farm and county yields, we 
estimate changes in farmer welfare when moving 
from the current program of using either APH or 
GRP alone to a combination of APH and area-
based coverage under SDC. This analysis identi-
fies the types of farmers who would find SDC 
most beneficial—in particular, indicating how 
much SDC benefits farmers in high-risk areas 
relative to those in low-risk areas. The analysis 
also identifies the preferred APH coverage level 
under the current program and when SDC is 
available, thus determining how farmers would 
likely adjust individual APH coverage levels if 
SDC became available. Thus, the analysis identi-
fies the characteristics of farmers who would find 
SDC most useful, provides monetary estimates of 
its farm-level benefits, and indicates how farmers 
would likely use SDC to manage their risk. 
 
Proposed SDC Program Structure 
 
The description of the proposed SDC program 
structure (USDA 2007b) indicates that SDC 
would be an option farmers could add to their 
existing APH yield insurance, with additional 
indemnity payments handled similarly to the cur-
rent GRP policy. Hence, before explaining SDC, 
we first describe APH and GRP. With APH, 
farmers choose an APH coverage level as a per-
centage of their historical average yield. Avail-
able coverage levels range from 50 percent to 85 
percent in 5 percent intervals (some counties are 
limited to a maximum of 75 percent). With GRP, 
farmers choose a GRP coverage level as a per-
centage of the expected county average yield, 
with available coverage levels ranging from 65 
percent to 90 percent in 5 percent intervals. For 
APH, 100 percent minus the chosen APH cover-
age level serves as a deductible, so that insured 
farmers share in the risk of loss and thus have 
incentives to use appropriate production practices 
to mitigate the potential for losses. Nevertheless, 
APH is subject to adverse selection and moral 
hazard, especially at high coverage levels. 
  Adverse selection occurs with APH because 
farmers who know that they are more likely to 
trigger indemnities are more likely to buy APH 
and use higher coverage levels (Goodwin 1993, 
Just, Calvin, and Quiggin 1999, Coble and Knight 
2002). Furthermore, APH also suffers moral haz-
ard problems because farmers who have APH 
coverage face incentives to adjust input use and 
other production practices so as to trigger or in-
crease the magnitude of indemnities, with such 
incentives increasing in the chosen APH coverage 
level (Chambers 1989, Babcock and Hennessy 
1996). A major advantage of GRP from the per-
spective of the insurer is that it is much less sus-
ceptible to these adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems—no individual farmer is more or 
less likely to trigger a GRP indemnity in a county, 
nor can an individual farmer meaningfully change 
the county average yield (Miranda 1991, Skees, 
Black, and Barnett 1997). However, though GRP 
has lower premiums, farmers generally prefer 
APH, since it pays indemnities for yield losses in 
excess of their deductible, while GRP does not 
guarantee this outcome. 
  In high-risk areas, buying APH with 85 percent 
coverage (the maximum available) is quite expen-
sive and still requires the farmer to bear the first 
15 percent of any yield loss. Increasing the maxi-
mum APH coverage level to 100 percent to help 
such farmers would greatly exacerbate adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, and so is 
not proposed. Rather, SDC would allow farmers 
to buy additional GRP-like coverage to add on 
top of their existing APH coverage, so that farm-
ers could obtain full coverage equal to 100 per-
cent of the value of their expected (average) yield 
without exacerbating adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Specifically, SDC would allow 
insured farmers to buy GRP as a supplement to 
their APH policy, with supplemental indemnities 
triggered by shortfalls in county yields, and with 
a maximum liability for this supplemental cover-
age equal to their APH deductible. 
  Specific language in the Farm Bill proposal 
(USDA 2007b, p. 154) indicates that 90 percent 
GRP coverage level will be used for SDC; that is, 
the county yield would have to be less than 90 
percent of the GRP expected county yield before 
an SDC indemnity would be paid. In addition, the 
Farm Bill proposes a more rapid payout of in-Mitchell and Knight  Economic Analysis of Supplemental Deductible Coverage   119 
 
 
demnities than is the case for the standard GRP. 
GRP currently pays indemnities proportional to 
the county yield loss, with 100 percent of the 
GRP liability paid only when the county yield is 
zero. However, a total crop loss for a whole 
county is a highly unlikely event for most crops 
in most counties. To improve the effectiveness of 
SDC coverage, the Farm Bill proposal indicates 
that 100 percent of the SDC liability would be 
paid when the county yield is 70 percent of the 
expected county yield (as opposed to 0 percent 
for GRP) (USDA 2007b, p. 154). Figure 1 graphi-
cally illustrates the difference between the two 
indemnity schedules—both have the same maxi-
mum payout, but this maximum is reached more 
quickly with the accelerated payment rate. Indem-
nity schedules of this sort have also been exam-
ined when evaluating weather derivatives for ag-
ricultural applications (Turvey, Weersink, and 
Chiang 2006, Vedenov, Epperson, and Barnett 
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Figure 1. SDC Indemnities Plotted versus 
County Yield with a Standard GRP Payment 





To formalize these verbal descriptions, we report 
specific equations for farmer indemnities under 
the different policies. These equations define the 
existing APH and GRP policies and how the pro-
posed SDC program would modify them. A 
farmer’s indemnity ($/ac) with APH (Iaph) is 
 
(1)  Iaph(α) = P×max(αµf – yf, 0), 
where α is the chosen APH coverage level, µf is 
the farm unit’s mean yield as determined by the 
actual production history, yf is the realized farm 
unit yield, and P is the APH price determined by 
the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) and 
used to value yield losses.
2 The APH coverage 
level  α is the proportion of the unit’s average 
yield (µf) chosen by the farmer as the unit’s yield 
guarantee, with available coverage options rang-
ing from 50 percent to 85 percent in 5 percent in-
crements. Hence, αµf in equation (1) is the farm 
unit’s per acre yield guarantee, the expression in 
the max(·) operator determines the unit’s per acre 
yield loss relative to this guarantee, and this loss 
is valued at the pre-established APH price P used 
to determine the amount of coverage and to pay 
indemnities. 
  A farmer’s indemnity ($/ac) with GRP (Igrp) is 
 










where Λ is the GRP maximum protection per acre 
($/ac) established by the RMA (equal to the pol-
icy’s maximum liability), γ is the GRP coverage 
level, µc is the county mean yield, and yc is the 
realized county yield. The GRP coverage level γ 
is the proportion of the county average yield (µc) 
the farmer chooses as the county yield guarantee 
for triggering indemnities. For GRP, multiple 
coverage levels are available, but SDC as pro-
posed would use the equivalent of the 90 percent 
GRP coverage level. In equation (2), γµc is the 
GRP per acre county yield guarantee based on the 
coverage level chosen, the expression in the 
max(·) operator is proportional yield loss (i.e., the 
proportion that the observed county yield falls 
below the county yield guarantee), and the in-
demnity is the product of this proportional loss 
and total liability Λ.
3 
 
                                                                                    
2 Farmers have the option of insuring at less than 100 percent of the 
RMA determined expected price, but insurance program experience 
has shown that the vast majority of participants choose coverage based 
on the maximum available price election.  
3 We assume that producers take the GRP maximum protection per 
acre published in the RMA county actuarial documents. Producers are 
allowed to choose amounts of coverage per acre less than this value, 
but most GRP participants choose to insure the maximum protection 
per acre. 120    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
  A farmer’s indemnity ($/ac) for APH with SDC 
coverage using a standard GRP payment rate 
(Isdc_st) is 
 
(3)        Isdc_st(α) = Iaph(α) 










where D(α) = P(1 – α)µf is the APH deductible 
($/ac) as a function of the APH coverage level. 
Equation (3) is the APH indemnity plus a GRP-
like indemnity using a 90 percent GRP coverage 
level trigger, but with the APH deducible (D) 
replacing the GRP maximum protection per acre 
(Λ). APH combined with SDC coverage with a 
standard GRP payment rate is not the policy pro-
posed in the USDA’s 2007 Farm Bill, but is ana-
lyzed here as a useful counterfactual for compari-
son. 
  A farmer’s indemnity ($/ac) for APH with SDC 
coverage using an accelerated GRP payment rate 
(Isdc_ac) is 
 
(4)      Isdc_ac(α) = Iaph(α) 
         + D(α) 0.9µ




y ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −
× ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, 
 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
Equation (4) is the APH indemnity plus a modi-
fied GRP indemnity. Again, a 90 percent GRP 
coverage level is used and the APH deductible re-
places the GRP maximum protection per acre. 
However, proportional yield loss [the term in the 
max(·) operator] is calculated as a proportion of 
0.9µc – 0.7µc = 0.2µc, not the county yield guar-
antee of 0.9µc. Since the term in the denominator 
in equation (4) is smaller than in equation (3), 
proportional yield loss in equation (4) is larger 
than in equation (3), so indemnities are larger. 
However, because proportional yield loss in this 
calculation can exceed 100 percent, the min(·) 
operator limits the proportional yield loss used to 
pay indemnities to 100 percent. Figure 1 illus-
trates the difference between the GRP-based com-
ponents of the SDC indemnity in equation (3) and 
equation (4). Also, to follow the USDA’s 2007 
Farm Bill proposal, equation (4) uses 70 percent 
of the county expected yield as the yield level by 
which the GRP component pays 100 percent of 
the APH deductible; other percentages are possi-
ble, but not examined here. 
 
 
Conceptual Framework and Analytical 
Methods 
 
Farmers currently buying yield insurance must 
choose APH or GRP. The goal of the analysis is 
to determine how adding SDC to the farmer 
choice set affects farmer welfare as measured by 
changes in certainty equivalents ($/ac) and farmer 
behavior as indicated by changes in optimal cov-
erage levels. Here we explain our modeling ap-
proach and its empirical implementation. First, 
we specify a parametric model of correlated 
county and farm yields, and then farmer revenue 
and utility. Next, we describe empirical imple-
mentation of Monte Carlo integration for calcu-
lating expected utility and actuarially fair premi-
ums. Finally, we specify the farmer’s optimiza-
tion problem—choosing the coverage level to 
maximize the expected utility of revenue from 
crop production—and then explain how the solu-
tions will be used to examine the effects of SDC 
on farmer welfare and optimal coverage levels. 
 
County and Farm Yields 
 
An important aspect of this analysis is the con-
nection between farm yields and county yields. 
Several approaches have been developed for 
modeling this connection. Deng, Barnett, and 
Vedenov (2007) describe a multiplicative model 
in which farm yield is a random proportion of the 
realized county yield. The mean of the random 
proportion determines the mean farm yield rela-
tive to the county yield, while the variance of the 
random proportion partly determines the propor-
tion of the farm yield variability due to idiosyn-
cratic effects. More common is an additive model 
with farm yield equal to the product of a constant 
factor and the realized county yield, plus a ran-
dom idiosyncratic error. Miranda (1991) used the 
model to examine area yield crop insurance com-
parable to GRP; Atwood, Baquet, and Watts 
(1996) used it to develop premiums for Income 
Protection (a different crop insurance policy); 
Carriquiry, Babcock, and Hart (2005) used it to 
propose improvements for developing APH pre-Mitchell and Knight  Economic Analysis of Supplemental Deductible Coverage   121 
 
 
miums; and Ramaswami and Roe (2004) derived 
its micro-production function foundations. 
  Unlike these studies, actual farm yield history 
data were unavailable for this analysis. By com-
bining farm yield histories with the associated 
county yield data, an empirical model of the mean 
and variability of county yield could be estimated, 
and more importantly, the mean and variance of 
farm yield and its stochastic relationship with 
county yield could also be estimated for each in-
dividual farmer in a population. Based on this 
empirical foundation, the welfare effect of offer-
ing SDC and the effect of SDC on the optimal 
APH coverage level could be estimated for each 
farmer, and these effects aggregated or their dis-
tribution examined. However, not having such 
data, we used a parametric approach, specifying a 
joint distribution for county and farm yields with 
known marginal distributions. The final stochas-
tic model of farm and county yields is specified 
by five parameters—the mean and variance for 
both county and farm yield and their correlation. 
We examine “typical” extreme cases—farmers 
with mean yields well above and well below the 
county average—both for farmers with a rela-
tively low and a relatively high level of correla-
tion with the county yield, and then identify the 
implied effects of SDC on farmer welfare and 
optimal APH coverage. Thus, our estimates serve 
as reasonable bounds on the magnitude of these 
effects for the majority of individual farmers. 
  For this analysis, we use beta distributions for 
both county and farm yields, a common assump-
tion for crop yields [Goodwin and Ker (2002) 
review several examples; also, see Sherrick et al. 
(2004)]. An important advantage of the beta dis-
tribution is that negative realizations do not oc-
cur. In high-risk counties with relatively low 
mean yields and high standard deviations, the 
likelihood of negative yields is not negligible for 
normal and similar distributions, so that ad hoc 
fixes would be required for simulated yields. 
  For each county examined here, mean county 
yield is set equal to the 2007 GRP expected 
county yield published in the county actuarial 
documents (USDA 2007c). The standard devia-
tion for each county was calibrated so that the 
actuarially fair premium rate for the simulated 
county yields with 90 percent GRP coverage 
matched the unsubsidized GRP rate for 90 per-
cent coverage published in the county actuarial 
documents (USDA 2007c). Finally, since the beta 
distribution requires specifying the minimum and 
maximum, we follow Babcock, Hart, and Hayes 
(2004) and set minimum yield to the maximum of 
zero and the mean minus four standard devia-
tions, and set maximum yield to the mean plus 
two standard deviations. 
  Table 1 lists the resulting means and standard 
deviations of county yield for the four counties 
examined here (as well as the yield coefficient of 
variation, APH price, and GRP maximum protec-
tion per acre). Tripp County in South Dakota and 
Hamilton County in Iowa respectively represent a 
high-risk and a low-risk county for producing 
corn, while Lubbock County in Texas and Coa-
homa County in Mississippi respectively repre-
sent a high-risk and a low-risk county for pro-
ducing cotton. These interpretations as low and 
high risk are based on the size of the GRP pre-
mium rate—for these counties, those with high 
average yields have lower premium rates than 
those with low average yields. This inverse rela-
tion between county average yield and yield risk 
is typical for most crops and counties and so we 
will follow it in our discussion here, but excep-
tions likely occur for some crops and counties. 
Finally, the beta distributions for yields implied 
by the parameters in Table 1 are fairly symmetric 
with slight negative skews, the skewness ranging 
between -0.13 and -0.44 for the four counties. 
  This analysis also uses a beta distribution for 
farm unit yields (Goodwin and Ker 2002, Sher-
rick et al. 2004). Within each county, we examine 
two types of producers—farmers with mean yield 
25 percent below the county average yield and 
farmers with mean yield 25 percent above the 
county average yield. The standard deviations for 
farm yields were calibrated so that the actuarially 
fair premium with the simulated farm yields 
matched the unsubsidized APH premium for 65 
percent coverage for the respective mean farm 
yield as published in the county actuarial docu-
ments (USDA 2007c). Farmers with above aver-
age yields are lower risk than farmers with below 
average yields for the same APH coverage, since 
for the cases examined here, APH premium rates 
decrease as average farm yield increases. Thus we 
follow this generalization in our discussion—that 
farmers with higher average yields are lower risk 
than farmers with lower average yields—though 
exceptions to this generalization likely exist for 122    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Parameters Used for Empirical Analysis of Supplemental Deductible Coverage 
 Corn  Cotton 
Parameter  Tripp, SD  Hamilton, IA  Lubbock, TX  Coahoma, MS 
County mean µc  56.9 bu/ac  176.4 bu/ac  232.0 lbs/ac  852.0 lbs/ac 
County st. dev. σc  16.26 bu/ac  24.9 bu/ac  97.35 lbs/ac  187.1 lbs/ac 
County  CV  28.6% 14.1% 42.0% 22.0% 
APH price P $3.50/bu  $3.50/bu  $0.52/lb  $0.53/lb 
GRP maximum protection per acre Λ  $251.78/ac $780.57/ac $187.92/ac $690.12/ac 
Farm mean 25% below county mean         
 Farm  mean  µc  43.0 bu/ac  132.0 bu/ac  174.0 lbs/ac  639.0 lbs/ac 
  Farm st. dev. σc  37.3 bu/ac  38.0 bu/ac  199.7 lbs/ac  277.7 lbs/ac 
 Farm  CV  86.7%  28.8%  114.7%  43.5% 
  65% APH premium Maph  $12.32/ac $3.68/ac $10.88/ac $7.87/ac 
Farm mean 25% above county mean         
 Farm  mean  µc  71.0 bu/ac  221.0 bu/ac  290.0 lbs/ac  1065.0 lbs/ac 
  Farm st. dev. σc  39.5 bu/ac  53.7 bu/ac  227.2 lbs/ac  399.8 lbs/ac 
  Farm  CV  55.6% 24.3% 78.3% 37.5% 




some crops in some counties. Finally, we follow 
Babcock, Hart, and Hayes (2004) and set mini-
mum yields to the maximum of zero and the mean 
minus four standard deviations, and maximum 
yields to the mean plus two standard deviations. 
Table 1 reports the resulting means and standard 
deviations of farm yield for farms with below 
average (high-risk) and with above average (low-
risk) yields in the four counties examined, as well 
as the associated APH premiums for 65 percent 
coverage. The resulting distributions of farm yield 
are generally consistent with published results for 
dryland production of corn and cotton (Coble, 
Heifner, and Zuniga 2000, Coble, Zuniga, and 
Heifner 2003, Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes 
1997). 
  The final parameter needed to specify the rela-
tionship between farm and county yields is their 
correlation. Little published data regarding ob-
served farm and county yield correlations for a 
range of crops and counties exist. A rare example 
is Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes (1997), who re-
port 0.8 as the average correlation for ten farms 
for a single crop in a single county. However, ac-
tual farm yield histories, from which we could 
derive empirical estimates of the distribution of 
the correlation between county and farm yields, 
were unavailable for this study. As a result, we 
selected two levels for Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient between farm and county yields (0.3 and 
0.9) as examples of farms with low and high yield 
correlation with the county yield to capture a 
wide range of conditions. Our purpose is to ex-
amine results at these reasonable extremes in or-
der to estimate the range of the expected effects 
of SDC for most farmers. 
 
Farmer Revenue and Insurance Premiums 
 
For this analysis, farm revenue is crop revenue 
(the product of the non-random price P and ran-
dom yield yf), plus the insurance indemnity minus 
the premium, where the indemnity and the pre-
mium depend on the chosen insurance coverage 
level. We do not include non-random production 
costs, given the difficulty in consistent estimation 
of such costs for different types of producers in Mitchell and Knight  Economic Analysis of Supplemental Deductible Coverage   123 
 
 
different counties across states. Thus, farmer re-
turns ($/ac) for insurance program i  ∈{none, 
aph, grp, sdc_st, sdc_ac} are 
(5)  πi(α) = Pyf + Ii(α) – Mi(α), 
where Mi(α) is the per acre farmer premium for 
insurance program i as a function of the APH 
coverage level. The subscript none implies no in-
surance, with Inone and Mnone equal to zero. The 
analysis uses a non-random price to focus only on 
yield risk and uses the published APH price for 
all crops and policies as an easily available esti-
mate of the expected crop price at harvest. 
  For farmer premiums, we analyze these insur-
ance policies using actuarially fair premiums 
equal to the expected value of the indemnity de-
rived through Monte Carlo integration. Farmer 
premiums currently include subsidies so that 
farmers pay less than what the RMA estimates to 
be actuarially fair. Table 2 reports the current 
premium subsidy rates for all APH and GRP cov-
erage levels. Since these premium subsidies are 
included in all current actual premiums, we use 
these same subsidy rates in our analysis. Since 
indemnities for SDC combined with APH are a 
combination of APH- and GRP-based indemni-
ties, premiums for APH combined with SDC use 
the appropriate APH subsidy rate for the APH 
portion of the premium and the 90 percent GRP 
subsidy rate for the SDC portion of the premium. 
Since all crop insurance premiums are currently 
subsidized, we do not report results for unsubsi-
dized premiums. 
 
Table 2. Current Premium Subsidy Rates for 
Federal Crop Insurance Policies 
Coverage Level  APH Subsidy Rate  GRP Subsidy Rate 
50% 67%  --- 
55% 64%  --- 
60% 64%  --- 
65% 59%  --- 
70% 59%  64% 
75% 55%  64% 
80% 48%  59% 
85% 38%  59% 
90% ---  55% 
Source: USDA (2007c).   
  As previously explained, the county yield stan-
dard deviations were calibrated so that the simu-
lated fair GRP premium rate matched the actual 
GRP rate. Thus by construction, our subsidized 
SDC premiums are equal to actual 90 percent 
coverage GRP premiums, with the protection per 
acre equal to the APH deductible. However, for 
SDC with an accelerated payment rate, the avail-
able GRP premium information does not allow 
calibration of simulated premiums to equal pub-
lished premiums. Therefore, premium rates for 
accelerated coverage were derived through Monte 
Carlo integration using the accelerated indemnity 
function reported in equation (4). APH premiums 
used in the analysis were also derived through the 
Monte Carlo integration. As previously explained, 
farm yield standard deviations were calibrated so 
that the simulated fair APH premium with a 65 
percent coverage level matched the actual APH 
rate for the same mean yield. Because APH pre-
miums are not exactly consistent with a single 
yield distribution (Babcock, Hart, and Hayes 
2004), the simulated APH premiums used for this 
analysis for coverage levels other than 65 percent 
will not match the actual premiums for these 
coverage levels, though they will be relatively 




For farmer risk preferences, we use a power util-
ity function, which implies constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA). Following Chavas (2004, p. 46), 
farmer utility from per acre returns for insurance 
program i ∈{none, aph, grp, sdc_st, sdc_ac} is 
 
(6)  Ui(α) = –πi(α)
1 – R, 
 
where  R > 1 is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion and πi is as defined by equation (5). 
Following Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga (2000) and 
Coble, Zuniga, and Heifner (2003), we use R = 
2.0 to reflect a moderate level of risk aversion.
4 
 Farmer  expected  utility for each policy is the 
expected value of equation (6): 
 
                                                                                    
4 Gollier (2001, p. 31) provides basic calculations to support the gen-
eral conclusion that a reasonable range for R is 1 to 4. However, it has 
been a common regularity (as of yet without a generally accepted ex-
planation) that empirical estimates of R commonly exceed this range 
(e.g., Chavas and Holt 1996, Cohen and Einav 2007, Schechter 2007).  124    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
(7)               EUi(α) = E[–πi(α)
1 – R] 
                                = 
1
π π (α)( π |α)
R
ii dF
− − ∫ , 
 
where F(πi|α) is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of random farmer returns πi conditional on 
the APH coverage level α. As equation (5) indi-
cates, πi is a transformation of farm yield yf, di-
rectly through crop revenue and indirectly through 
the indemnity, so that for most of the policies 
analyzed, the actual conditional distribution func-
tion  (π |α) i F  is generally difficult to express as a 
closed-form equation due to the farm and county 
yield distributions used and the truncated nature 
of insurance indemnities. Furthermore, the trans-
formation of returns πi by the utility function cre-
ates additional nonlinearity so that closed-form 
analytical solutions for expected utility do not 
exist for any of the policies analyzed. As a result, 
numerical methods are needed to calculate ex-





Greene (2003) provides an overview of Monte 
Carlo integration, widely used to approximate 
multiple integrals of complex functions. Numer-
ous applications in agriculture and crop insurance 
exist (e.g., Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes 1997, 
Hurley, Mitchell, and Rice 2004, Mitchell, Gray, 
and Steffey 2004). We use the method to approxi-
mate the integrals for calculating expected utility 
in equation (7) and actuarially fair premiums equal 
to the expected indemnities. 
  County and farm yields are the fundamental 
random variables in this analysis; all other ran-
dom variables are functions of these two vari-
ables, their moments, and other parameters. We 
use the method of Richardson and Condra (1981), 
explained in more detail by Fackler (1991), to 
draw vectors of county and farm yields with the 
required correlation. Goodwin and Ker (2002) 
discuss the merits and weaknesses of this method 
for correlating random variables. Monte Carlo 
integration for this analysis was implemented 
using Microsoft Excel 2003. Experimentation in-
dicated that 10,000 random draws were sufficient 
for results to converge. 
Analyzing Supplemental Deductible Coverage 
 
The analysis assumes that farmers choose the 
APH coverage level to maximize their expected 
utility. Mathematically, the farmer’s problem is 
 
(8)   
α max (α) i EU  = 
1
π α max π (α)( π |α)
R
ii dF
− − ∫ , 
 
where  α  ∈{0%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 
75%, 80%, 85%) is the farmer’s choice variable. 
Note that α = 0% is a special case used here to 
incorporate no insurance and GRP coverage into 
the choice set without creating separate scenarios 
for these two policies. For the current APH policy 
(i = aph),  α = 0% indicates no insurance (i = 
none), and when examining either of the SDC 
policies (i = sdc_st or i = sdc_ac), α = 0% indi-
cates 90 percent GRP coverage (i = grp). This 
notation collapses the five insurance policies into 
three scenarios to analyze: APH alone (or no in-
surance if α = 0%) (i = aph), APH combined with 
SDC using a standard GRP payment rate (or GRP 
alone if α = 0%) (i = sdc_st), and APH combined 
with SDC using an accelerated GRP payment rate 
(or GRP alone if α = 0%) (i = sdc_ac). Simula-
tions were conducted with each APH coverage 
level (0 percent, 50 percent to 85 percent in 5 
percent steps), and a simple search identified the 
optimal APH coverage level (
* αi ) and associated 
optimal expected utility (
*
i EU ) for each of the 
three scenarios. These optimal expected utilities 
were then converted into the associated optimal 
certainty equivalents ($/ac) for each scenario: 
 
(9)  ( )





  Figure 2 illustrates example results for Tripp 
County in South Dakota and Hamilton County in 
Iowa with parameterizations as reported in the 
figure caption. The three lines in each plot indi-
cate farmer certainty equivalents for all APH cov-
erage levels for all policies as labeled. The “No 
Insurance” or “GRP Alone” choices of α = 0% 
are the points on the vertical axis, connected by 
dashed lighter lines to results with “APH Alone” 
(α = 50 percent to 85 percent in 5 percent steps). 
From the data used to generate plots such as those 
illustrated in Figure 2, the optimal APH coverage 
level (
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Figure 2. Certainty Equivalent Returns for Corn in Tripp County, South Dakota (top), and 
Hamilton County, Iowa (bottom), for the Three Insurance Scenarios 
Note: With fair subsidized premiums, a farm mean yield 25 percent above the county average, and a county-farm yield correlation 





i CE ) were identified for the three scenarios 
for each parameterization. The vertical gap be-
tween the three lines is the increase in farmer 
certainty equivalents when a farmer switches from 
APH alone to APH with SDC with a standard or 
with an accelerated payment rate. Because so 
many parameterizations were analyzed, the opti-
mal coverage levels and certainty equivalents for 
each parameterization are not reported, but are 
available upon request from the authors. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The presentation of results first discusses general 
findings for the data, such as those illustrated in 
Figure 2. However, primary presentation of re-
sults uses tables to focus on changes in certainty 
equivalents and optimal coverage levels between 
the scenarios to provide monetary estimates of 
farmer benefits from SDC and to determine how 
farmers would likely adjust APH coverage levels 
if SDC became available. Changes in optimal cer-
tainty equivalents between using either the cur-
rent APH or GRP policy alone and either APH 
combined with SDC using a standard GRP pay-
ment rate or with SDC using an accelerated GRP 
payment rate are estimates of the farm-level bene-
fits of the proposed SDC policy. Changes in the 
optimal APH coverage levels between using either 
the current APH or GRP policy alone and either 
APH combined with SDC using a standard GRP 
payment rate or with SDC using an accelerated 
GRP payment rate indicate how farmers would 
likely adjust APH coverage levels if SDC became 
available. 
  Figure 2 shows the general results that occur 
for each county and farm type examined. First, 
farmer certainty equivalents with APH always 
exceed the “No Insurance” case (even for risk-
neutral farmers) and, at any given coverage level, 
certainty equivalents with APH plus SDC with an 
accelerated payment rate always exceed certainty 
equivalents with APH plus SDC using the stan-
dard payment rate. SDC increased farmer welfare 
more at lower APH coverage levels than at higher 
levels, i.e., the gap between the “APH Alone” and 
the “APH + Accelerated SDC” curves is larger at 
lower coverage levels in Figure 2. Relative to the 
“APH Alone” curve, accelerated SDC “lifts” farmer 
certainty equivalents more at the lower APH cov-
erage levels, so that the “APH + Accelerated 
SDC” curve becomes very “flat,” as for Tripp 
County, or “U-shaped,” as for Hamilton County. 
In general, optimal APH coverage levels for risk-
averse farmers ranged from 75 percent to 85 
percent. Only for a few of the risk-neutral cases 
examined did this “lifting” of the lower end of the 
accelerated SDC curves cause the optimal APH 
coverage level to jump across the “U-shaped” 
curve to α = 50%. In addition, GRP (α = 0%) 
was optimal relative to APH or APH with SDC 
using a standard payment rate in only one county, 
and then only for the risk-neutral case. 
  Table 3 reports the increase in farmer certainty 
equivalents as $/ac when switching from using 
APH alone to using APH combined with SDC 
using either the standard GRP payment rate or the 
accelerated payment rate. Table 4 reports the de-
crease in the optimal APH coverage level associ-
ated with switching from APH alone to APH 
combined with either type of SDC examined. 
Based on the results in these tables, we draw sev-
eral generalizations regarding the effect of SDC. 
 
Farmer Benefits from SDC 
 
For all cases in Table 3, SDC generates positive 
benefits relative to the current program of using 
either APH or GRP alone, implying that most 
farmers would find some benefit from SDC. We 
focus initially on results with the accelerated 
payment rate, as this is the proposed program. In 
Tripp County, SDC generates a benefit for corn 
farmers ranging from about $5/ac to over $11.40/ac 
with the accelerated payment rate; benefits for 
Hamilton County corn farmers are fairly similar 
in magnitude. Though the magnitude of the bene-
fit of SDC is similar for corn farmers in these two 
locations, the relative benefit of SDC in Tripp 
County is much larger, since the revenue potential 
for corn in Tripp County is much lower. For cot-
ton farmers, SDC with the accelerated payment 
rate generates benefits ranging from about $4/ac 
to $11.50/ac in Lubbock County and over $6/ac 
to $16.50/ac in Coahoma County. However, again, 
since the revenue potential for cotton is lower in 
Lubbock County, the relative benefit of SDC is 
larger. Relative to the risk-averse cases examined, 
results for the risk-neutral cases are almost uni-
formly dampened—the low ends of the ranges are 
not as low and the high ends of the ranges are not 
as high. Thus, the reported ranges for the benefit Mitchell and Knight  Economic Analysis of Supplemental Deductible Coverage   127 
 
 
Table 3. Net Benefit of APH Plus SDC with a Standard and with an Accelerated Payment Rate
a 
      Standard Rate  Accelerated Rate 
County Mean  Yield
b  ρfc  Risk Averse  Risk Neutral  Risk Averse  Risk Neutral 
0.3  2.04 1.76 5.06 5.59 
25% below 
0.9  2.99 1.76 8.19 5.61 
0.3  2.36 2.84 6.72 8.91 
Tripp County, SD 
25% above 
0.9 3.52  2.86  11.40  8.95 
0.3  1.26 1.11 4.74 5.36 
25% below 
0.9  1.70 1.10 6.52 5.31 
0.3  2.06 1.63 7.75  11.00 
Hamilton County, IA 
25% above 
0.9 2.76  1.63  10.59  10.94 
0.3  2.01 1.93 4.17 4.78 
25% below 
0.9  3.11 1.93 7.10 4.78 
0.3  3.28 3.03 6.61 7.86 
Lubbock County, TX 
25% above 
0.9 4.97  3.03  11.53  7.87 
0.3  2.10 5.17 6.36 8.56 
25% below 
0.9 2.93  5.18  10.43  8.55 
0.3 3.41  3.52  10.35  15.60 
Coahoma County, MS 
25% above 
0.9 4.73  3.52  16.54  15.53 
aBenefits measured as the increase in farmer certainty equivalents ($/ac) relative to the current program of using either APH or 
GRP alone.
 
bRelative to county mean. 
 
 
of SDC encompass results for the risk-averse and 
risk-neutral cases examined. Finally, farmer bene-
fits from SDC with the standard payment rate are 
lower, indicating the essential nature of the accel-
erated payment rate in order for SDC to generate 
a significant farmer benefit. Farmer benefits with 
the standard payment rate are less than about 
$3.50/ac for the corn cases examined, and less 
than $5.20/ac for the cotton cases. 
  Among the trends in Table 3, note that as the 
farm-county yield correlation increases, the bene-
fits from SDC increase for risk-averse farmers, 
but remain relatively unchanged for risk-neutral 
farmers. Risk-averse farmers derive greater bene-
fit from SDC as their yields more closely follow 
county yields because SDC indemnities become 
more likely to coincide with low farm yield out-
comes and thus reduce revenue variance. Risk-
neutral farmers do not respond to changes in reve-
nue variance due to SDC, but rather seek the 
APH coverage level that maximizes their ex-
pected revenue when APH is combined with 
SDC. 
  For all the cases examined in Table 3, within 
the same county, low-risk farmers (those with 
mean yields 25 percent above the county mean) 
receive larger benefits from SDC than high-risk 
farmers (those with mean yields 25 percent below 
the county mean). This result occurs because of 
the difference in yield (and hence revenue) po-
tential between the high- and low-risk farmers in 
a county. For a given coverage level, the APH 
deductible is larger for low-risk (high mean) 
farmers because they have a larger yield guaran-
tee due to their greater yield potential. For a given 
county yield outcome, SDC pays the same pro-
portion of the APH deductible for both types of 
farmers, but the indemnity is larger for the low-
risk (high mean) farmers because they have a 
larger APH deductible. 
  When comparing farmers in a low-risk county 
to comparable farmers in a high-risk county in 
Table 3, this yield potential effect does not al-
ways hold. In most cases, farmers in high-risk 
counties derive smaller benefits from SDC than 
comparable farmers in low-risk counties, which is 
consistent with their difference in yield potentials. 
For example, both high-risk and low-risk cotton 
farmers in Lubbock County derive smaller bene-
fits from SDC than comparable high- and low- 128    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage Point Decrease in the Optimal APH Coverage Level with APH Plus SDC 
with the Standard and with an Accelerated SDC Payment Rate
a 
      Standard Rate  Accelerated Rate 
County Mean  Yield
b  ρfc  Risk Averse  Risk Neutral  Risk Averse  Risk Neutral 
0.3 0%  0%  0%  5% 
25% below 
0.9 0%  0%  5%  5% 
0.3 0%  5%  5%  10% 
Tripp County, SD 
25% above 
0.9 5%  5%  10%  10% 
0.3 0%  5%  0%  10% 
25% below 
0.9 0%  5%  0%  10% 
0.3 0%  0%  0%  35% 
Hamilton County, IA 
25% above 
0.9 0%  0%  0%  35% 
0.3 0%  5%  5%  5% 
25% below 
0.9 5%  5%  5%  5% 
0.3 0%  0%  0%  15% 
Lubbock County, TX 
25% above 
0.9 0%  0%  5%  15% 
0.3 0%  80%
c 0%  10% 
25% below 
0.9 0%  80%
c 5%  10% 
0.3 0%  0%  0%  30% 
Coahoma County, MS 
25% above 
0.9 0%  0%  5%  30% 
aDecreases measured relative to the current program of using either APH or GRP alone.
 
bRelative to county mean.   
cShift from 80 percent APH coverage to GRP. 
 
 
risk farmers in Coahoma County. However, for 
the corn counties examined, this trend no longer 
consistently occurs. Low-risk corn farmers in 
Tripp County with a yield correlation of 0.3 de-
rive smaller benefits from SDC than low-risk 
farmers in Hamilton County, which is consistent 
with the yield potential effect, but this outcome 
reverses with a yield correlation of 0.9. Also, 
high-risk corn farmers derive greater benefit from 
SDC in Tripp County than in Hamilton County, 
which again is opposite the outcome implied by 
the difference in yield potentials. 
  The benefits of SDC arise from two primary 
sources. First, SDC allows a farmer to increase 
insurance coverage to also include the APH de-
ductible. In general, the larger the yield potential, 
the larger this benefit becomes. Thus, counties 
with high yield potential (low risk) will derive 
greater benefit from SDC. Second, SDC provides 
some protection from systemic risk as captured in 
the county yield. APH provides a measure of 
protection against both idiosyncratic and systemic 
risk, while GRP provides protection only against 
systemic risk; SDC combines both to provide 
increased protection against systemic risk. The 
greater the systemic risk, the larger the benefit of 
SDC becomes. Thus, counties with high systemic 
risk will derive greater benefit from SDC. The 
yield potential and systemic risk effects of SDC 
counteract each other so that the types of farmers 
who will derive the greatest benefit from SDC is 
an empirical issue—high-risk farmers with low 
average yields or low-risk farmers with high av-
erage yields. 
  The results in Table 3 show that within a 
county, where the systemic risk is held constant, 
low-risk farmers derive greater benefit from SDC, 
which is to be expected. Comparing across coun-
ties, where the systemic risk is no longer held 
constant, high-risk farmers in one county gener-
ally derive greater benefit relative to the low-risk 
case (corn in Tripp County versus in Hamilton 
County), while the reverse occurs in another 
county relative to its low-risk case (cotton in Lub-
bock County versus in Coahoma County). For the 
corn examples, the systemic risk benefit of SDC Mitchell and Knight  Economic Analysis of Supplemental Deductible Coverage   129 
 
 
dominates the yield potential effect, while for 
cotton, the yield potential effect dominates. If 
other counties and crops were examined, which 
effect dominated could change.  
 
Effect of SDC on Optimal APH Coverage Levels 
 
Because SDC provides protection from systemic 
risk, SDC can serve as an imperfect substitute for 
higher APH coverage, which can imply a 
reduction in the optimal APH coverage level. 
Thus, for all cases in Table 4, the optimal APH 
coverage with SDC either decreases or remains 
unchanged—the optimal APH coverage level never 
increases when APH is combined with SDC. 
With the accelerated payment rate, the decrease is 
as large as 35 percentage points (i.e., a shift from 
85 percent to 50 percent coverage), but these 
large decreases occur for the risk-neutral cases. 
For the risk-averse cases, the decrease is gener-
ally 0 or 5 percentage points, with one case of 10 
percentage points. The implication is that as 
farmers become less risk-averse, SDC decreases 
the optimal APH coverage level more. With the 
standard payment rate, the optimal coverage level 
decreases no more than 5 percentage points, ex-
cept for a few cases when it becomes optimal to 
choose GRP over SDC. However, the difference 
between the risk-averse and risk-neutral cases is 
much smaller. 
  For the risk-averse cases with an accelerated 
payment rate, no consistent pattern emerges re-
garding whether SDC has a larger effect on opti-
mal APH coverage levels for low-risk or high-
risk farmers. In the two low-risk counties (corn in 
Hamilton County and cotton in Coahoma County), 
no difference exists between the decrease in opti-
mal APH coverage for high- and low-risk farmers. 
The same occurs in Lubbock County (a high-risk 
cotton county), except for one case in which the 
optimal APH coverage level decreases more for 
the high-risk cotton farmer. In Tripp County, a 
high-risk corn county, low-risk (high mean) corn 
farmers have a larger decrease in optimal APH 
coverage than high-risk farmers with low mean 
yields. 
  When examining the risk-neutral cases, how-
ever, a consistent pattern emerges—low-risk 
farmers experience a larger decrease in the opti-
mal APH coverage level with SDC. This larger 
decrease in optimal APH coverage for low-risk 
farmers holds when comparing low- and high-risk 
farmers within a county and when comparing 
comparable farmers in low- and high-risk coun-
ties. The implication is that the effect of SDC on 
expected revenue decreases the optimal APH 
coverage level more for low-risk farmers, but risk 
aversion dampens this expected revenue effect of 
SDC because risk-averse farmers derive risk man-
agement benefits from higher APH coverage lev-
els. These dampening effects of risk aversion de-
pend on the specifics of the yield distributions 
and lead to the difficult-to-interpret pattern of ef-
fects of SDC on optimal APH coverage levels in 
Table 4. 
  As the farm yield becomes more correlated 
with the county yield, the effectiveness of SDC as 
a substitute for APH increases, and so the optimal 
APH coverage level with SDC should decrease or 
remain unchanged. For the results in Table 4, this 
effect of the correlation between the farm and 
county yields is minimal. For most cases, as the 
correlation increases, the optimal APH coverage 
level remains unchanged. However, for a few 
risk-averse cases, the optimal coverage decreases, 
e.g., Coahoma County and low-risk farmers in 
Lubbock County and Tripp County. The main im-
plication is that the reduction in the optimal APH 
coverage level is fairly non-responsive to the 




We examined the farm-level effects of Supple-
ment Deductible Coverage (SDC) as contained in 
the USDA Farm Bill proposal. Our empirical 
analysis used a variety of assumptions to param-
eterize a model of correlated county and farm 
yields, in particular calibrating the mean and stan-
dard deviation of yields to match crop insurance 
premium rates. We developed corn and cotton 
examples for farms in low-risk/high-yield and 
high-risk/low-yield counties, examining results at 
reasonable extremes for county-farm yield corre-
lations. We used the results of these numerical 
experiments to estimate the range of effects to 
expect for most farmers if a study were to be 
conducted using actual farm and county yield his-
tories. We focused our analysis on the effects of 
SDC on farmer welfare and the optimal level of 
insurance coverage. 
  Our results indicate that SDC, as structured un-
der the USDA Farm Bill proposal, generates wel-
fare benefits for all farms analyzed. SDC in-130    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
creased farmer welfare from $5 to over $11/ac for 
the corn examples examined, and from $4 to over 
$16/ac for the cotton examples. However, the in-
cidence of this benefit varied depending on the 
specific assumptions, which we interpreted as the 
interaction of two offsetting effects—a yield po-
tential effect and a systemic risk effect. 
  Farmers with higher yield potential derive 
greater benefit from SDC because, at any APH 
coverage level, their APH deductibles insurable 
under SDC are larger. In addition, because SDC 
provides increased protection against systemic 
risk, farmers in counties with greater systemic 
risk derive greater benefit from SDC. However, 
crop insurance premiums for both GRP and APH 
indicate that, for most crops in most counties, as 
yield potential increases, yield variability de-
creases. As a result, areas with high yield poten-
tial tend to have lower levels of systemic risk and 
vice versa. This general trend implies that the 
yield potential effect tends to work in the oppo-
site direction of the systemic risk effect, so that 
the net effect of SDC on farmer welfare is an em-
pirical issue depending on the specifics of the 
yield distributions. 
  SDC also decreased the optimal APH coverage 
level, generally by at most 5 percentage points for 
the risk-averse cases examined, but from 5 to 35 
percentage points for the risk-neutral cases. Thus 
SDC provides incentives for many farmers to shift 
from individual coverage to area coverage, and so 
reduces the potential for moral hazard, adverse 
selection, fraud, and program abuse for the crop 
insurance program, since these problems are typi-
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